References to “Juicebox multisig” or “multisig” in this proposal refer to the Gnosis Safe wallet on the Ethereum mainnet at 0xAF28bcB48C40dBC86f52D459A6562F658fc94B1e.
References to “threshold” or “multisig threshold” in this proposal refer to the number of owner accounts needed to confirm a Gnosis Safe transaction before it can be executed.
References to “governance process” or “Juicebox governance process” in this proposal refer to the processes by which Juicebox DAO is governed, and any future amendments to those processes. The current iteration of these processes are described at https://gateway.pinata.cloud/ipfs/Qmc6QqbnMm2hVobU12x11aigHYdzcYGhho7pH8Xz3TrrW2?preview=1.
References to “members” of the multisig in this proposal refer to Gnosis owner accounts of the Juicebox multisig.
Summary:
This proposal formally defines the expectations and responsibilities of Juicebox multisig members.
Specification:
Implement the following rules:
- The Juicebox multisig and Juicebox multisig owner accounts must agree to execute the will of JBX token holders, as expressed through the Juicebox Governance Process.
- The Juicebox multisig threshold must be set to the lowest possible number such that the threshold is above 60% of the number of Juicebox multisig owner accounts.
- If there are more than five owner accounts of the Juicebox multisig, Juicebox multisig owner accounts can be removed from the multisig at request of the owner accounts which would be removed. Otherwise, all Juicebox multisig wallet actions must be explicitly approved by JBX token holders through the Juicebox Governance Process, or follow the Emergency Governance Process.
Existing multisig members must agree to these principles, and prospective multisig members must agree to these principles before being added to the multisig. Violators will be immediately removed from the multisig if there are more than five multisig owner accounts. Otherwise, the multisig member will be removed once a suitable replacement has been found, in no more than 7 days.
Risks:
- Putting control of the multisig fully in the hands of JBX holders exposes the DAO to risk if JBX goes into the wrong hands.
- Increasing the multisig threshold may impede progress. In a situation where the DAO needs to act quickly (such as a breach of security), having a high threshold could be disastrous.
- If Juicebox DAO needs to act quickly in an emergency, explicit governance approval may be impractical. The Emergency Governance Process should be improved over coming funding cycles to mitigate this risk.
- In a situation where a suitable multisig replacement could not be found within 7 days of a removal, trust in Juicebox would be severely undermined.
Rationale:
These principles are intended as general guidelines that formalize existing processes while being flexible enough to adapt as Juicebox changes over time. This proposal will need to be overwritten in the event that Juicebox DAO moves to onchain governance, or if the governance process changes dramatically.
Timeframe:
These rules shall be implemented immediately and will apply indefinitely.
Copyright Disclaimer:
Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.